Topic: Mitigating the BEAST attack on TLS

[Steffen]

See the post all about a attack against SSL from Ivan:

https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2011/10/17/mitigating-the-beast-attack-on-tls

Note:
Ivan was the original developer of mod_security. Nowadays he is also quite busy with SSL security.

Steffen

[James Blond]

Doing that reduces the encryption. I made something like that and now I have only 128 bit encryption vis RC4 instead of the 256 AES.

Any chance to have 256 bit encrytion again?

[glsmith]

As far as I read it, ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 is an TLS/1.2 cipher. Since OpenSSL 0.9.8 and 1.0.0 do not speak TLS/1.2, I doubt the cipher is available. Secondly, isn't it AES256-SHA and not AES256-SHA256?

http://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html#AES_ciphersuites_from_RFC3268_e

So it goes to the first valid one it finds in the list, RC4.

Of course AES256-SHA is a CBC cipher, and therefore can be attacked. I think for the moment 128bit RC4 is better than 256bit that can be 'beasted'

[James Blond]

[Steffen]

Attention, that Ivan changed the recommendation for OpenSSL 1.0.1:

SSLHonorCipherOrder On
SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:AES128-GCM-SHA256:RC4:HIGH:!MD5:!aNULL:!EDH


Steffen

[holziusa]

for 1st/default vhost
SSLHonorCipherOrder On
SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:AES128-GCM-TLSv1-SHA256:RC4:HIGH:!MD5:!aNULL:!EDH

all others

SSLHonorCipherOrder On
SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:AES128-GCM-SHA256:RC4:HIGH:!MD5:!aNULL:!EDH

not sure about the order if TLSv1 matters front or end
of line